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Legal Implications of Epilepsy 
H. Richard Beresford 
Department of Neurology, North Shore University Hospital, Manhasset, and Department of Neurology, Cornell 
University Medical College, New York, New York, U.S.A. 
Summary: Physicians who care for patients with epilepsy 
may function as agents or targets of social control. As 
agents, they may assist in the identification and control 
of epileptic drivers, may provide information that enables 
fair and appropriate job placements for epileptic persons, 
and give testimony that helps the legal system resolve 
issues relating to the liability of epileptic persons for harm 
attributed to seizures or interictal behavioral distur- 
bances. As targets, they may be charged with negligent 
failure to diagnose, treat, or inform about epilepsy or its 
associated problems, with failure to exercise due care in 
protecting persons harmed by their patients, or with fail- 
ure to preserve confidentiality of medical information. Al- 
though legislation and judicial decisions have defmed 
some of the physician’s legal duties with reasonable clar- 
ity, areas of uncertainty remain, particularly regarding the 
issue of violating medical confidentiality for the benefit 
of persons other than the patient. Key Words: Epilepsy- 
Automobile driving-Confidentiality. 
Epilepsy has dimensions that generate a variety 
of legal problems. Because a person may experience 
sudden and abrupt loss of consciousness, there is a 
risk of harm both to the person and others affected 
by his or her loss of control (Spudis et al., 1986; 
Gastaut and Zifkin, 1987). Ictal events or interictal 
disturbances may disrupt cognitive or affective pro- 
cesses in more subtle ways than frank unconscious- 
ness and some resulting behaviors may be antisocial 
(Stevens, 1975; Waxman and Geschwind, 1975; 
Ashford et al., 1980; Pritchard et al., 1980). Treat- 
ment itself may compromise neurological functions 
in ways that lead to injury to patients or others, or 
cause damage to extraneural or fetal tissues (Ro- 
senbaum, 1982; Dalessio, 1985). Stigmatizing per- 
sons with epilepsy may lead to discrimination and 
other unjust social responses. Thus, physicians who 
care for persons with epilepsy can expect to interact 
with the legal system in one context or another. 
One view of law is that it is a system of social 
control designed to protect interests of both indi- 
viduals and the larger community. In this frame- 
work, a physician may be either an agent or a target 
of social control. As an agent, the physician protects 
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patients from harm, protects others from risks 
posed by patients, and contributes expertise that 
helps the legal system resolve disputes that involve 
medical questions. A physician becomes a target 
when aggrieved persbns claim that he or she wrong- 
fully harmed or failed to protect them, or when state 
agencies assert violations of particular laws or reg- 
ulations (such as those relating to the care of persons 
with epilepsy ar other disorders marked by parox- 
ysmal impairment of neurologic functions). This 
paper will consider selected aspects of the physi- 
cian’s role as agent or target of social control, em- 
phasizing particular cases that illustrate how the 
legal system attempts to define, balance, and pro- 
tect interests of epileptics, their physicians, and 
other members of society. No effort will be made 
to survey the gamut of legal problems persons with 
epilepsy may encounter or to catalogue the large 
body of state and federal law that pertains to epi- 
lepsy. 
PHYSICIAN AS AGENT OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
The epileptic driver 
Driving as an antisocial act 
In People v Decina (1956), New York’s highest 
court upheld a charge of criminal negligence against 
a defendant who had a seizure while driving, lost 
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control of his car, and struck and killed four chil- 
dren. The defendant had had seizures for 9 years, 
probably the result of a brain abscess that had been 
surgically removed several years before the onset 
of epilepsy. At the time of the accident, he was tak- 
ing antiepileptic drugs and had had no seizures for 
9 months. In upholding the validity of the criminal 
indictment, the court reasoned that his conduct in 
operating an automobile knowing he might unex- 
pectedly lose consciousness constituted culpable in- 
difference to the rights of others. The court ordered 
a new trial, however, ruling that the trial judge had 
erred in allowing testimony by a resident physician 
who had evaluated the defendant after the accident 
and had obtained the history of his previous sei- 
zures. The court viewed this as confidential infor- 
mation that could not be disclosed without the con- 
sent of the patient since it was obtained while the 
defendant was receiving medical care. In other 
words, the court recognized that an individual’s in- 
terest in medical privacy is sufficiently strong to re- 
strict nonconsensual disclosures about his condition 
in a legal proceeding. Three disSenting judges would 
have dismissed the case entirely on the ground that 
a person who is unconscious because of a seizure 
cannot be said to act with criminal intent. 
This troubling case underscores the social control 
function of law in its emphasis on preventing con- 
duct that endangers society, such as risking loss of 
control of a vehicle. The physician who cares for a 
patient with epilepsy serves this function by pre- 
scribing appropriate antiepileptic drugs, counseling 
about the risks of driving, and meeting formal re- 
porting requirements aimed at identifying poten- 
tially dangerous drivers. The case also highlights the 
medical ethical principle that the confidentiality of 
communications between physician and patient 
should be protected unless the patient consents to 
disclosure, and the court’s reasoning is consistent 
with the recent Massachusetts decision in Alberts v 
Devine (1985) that affirms the legal duty of physi- 
cians to protect confidentiality of communications 
from patients. As will be seen, this tension between 
duty to society and duty to patient may disturb the 
relationship between physicians and epileptic pa- 
tients ‘who drive (Masland, 1978; Gregory, 1980). 
Reporting laws 
All states seek to regulate driving by persons with 
epilepsy (Epilepsy Foundation of America, 
1 9 8 5 ~ ~ ) .  Restrictions on licensure vary widely. 
Some states require seizure-free intervals for spec- 
ified periods before driving is lawful, while others 
permit driving based on a physician’s statement that 
a patient’s epilepsy will not prevent safe operation 
of a vehicle. In either situation, medical evaluations 
are required before driving is permitted provided 
that the licensing agency learns that an applicant 
has epilepsy. The agency may obtain this informa- 
tion from the applicant, the applicant’s physician, 
or from a police or other official report disclosing 
the possibility of a seizure disorder. Most states im- 
pose a duty on applicants to disclose medical con- 
ditions relevant to driving, including epilepsy, and 
do not require physicians to report their epileptic 
patients to the licensing agency. Laws of a few 
states mandate reports by physicians but differ in 
what they require and what penalties they impose 
for failure to report. These laws generally immunize 
physicians against liability for reporting that com- 
plies with formal regulatory requirements (Gregory, 
1980; Epilepsy Foundation of America, 1985~). 
The regulatory approaches of two states, Con- 
necticut and New York, illustrate the contrasting 
strategies of mandatory reporting by persons with 
epilepsy and physician-initiated reporting. 
New York requires the applicant who “has ever 
suffered loss of consciousness” to submit “proof of 
fitness’’ to drive. This may take the form of a phy- 
sician’s statement that the applicant has had no loss 
of consciousness during the previous 12 months, 
that any loss of consciousness was due only to an 
adjustment of medications, or that the applicant is 
capable of “safe operation” of a motor vehicle. If 
the applicant provides such a statement and a med- 
ical consultant to the motor vehicle agency concurs, 
the agency may license the applicant. If no “proof 
of fitness” is provided, licensure may be denied or 
suspended after a hearing in which the applicant 
may present evidence that he can safely operate a 
motor vehicle (New York Code of Rules and Reg- 
ulations, 1987). This approach provides flexibility 
because it permits driving by persons who may have 
had seizures in the year preceding the license ap- 
plication if their physicians believe it is safe for them 
to drive. It also affords applicants the opportunity 
for a hearing to demonstrate their suitability for li- 
censure. Once granted, a license may be suspended 
any time a person poses an “immediate hazard.” 
Evidence of such a hazard may include a physician’s 
opinion or evidence from other sources (e.g., police 
report) that a particular motor vehicle accident re- 
sulted from a seizure. While laws of several other 
states also require that applicants for licensure dis- 
close seizures or other impairments of conscious- 
ness and relieve physicians from primary respon- 
sibility for reporting a diagnosis of epilepsy to a 
licensing agency, many impose requirements of 
specified seizure-free intervals as a condition of li- 
censure and do not permit licensing of applicants 
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only on the basis of a physician’s opinion that it is 
safe for them to drive. 
Connecticut statutes (1979) require a physician to 
report “immediately” to the state health depart- 
ment the identity of a person “known to him to be 
subject to recurrent attacks of epilepsy . . . or to 
recurrent periods of unconsciousness uncontrolled 
by medical treatment.” The health department then 
must transmit this information to the motor vehicle 
agency if the person is 16 years of age or older. The 
agency must protect the confidentiality of the in- 
formation and use it only to determine eligibility for 
licensure. A medical advisory board assists the 
agency in its licensing decisions. No data provided 
by physicians can be used as evidence at a trial with- 
out the person’s consent, and physicians who report 
as prescribed by law are provided immunity from 
liability for reporting that is in “good faith, non- 
negligent, and non-malicious.” A few other states 
require reporting by physicians, including Califor- 
nia, Illinois, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and 
provide immunity to those who report (Gregory, 
1980; Epilepsy Foundation of America, 1985~).  
Modest fines are provided for failure to report, but 
Pennsylvania law would expressly permit a finding 
of negligence against a physician who fails to report 
an epileptic driver who later has a motor vehicle 
accident (Epilepsy Foundation of America, 1985~) .  
Despite universality of laws requiring some sort 
of reporting to state agencies, the degree of com- 
pliance by either persons with epilepsy or their phy- 
sicians is uncertain. Anecdotal reports of noncom- 
pliance are common, and it seems safe to assume 
that state agencies license persons whom the agen- 
cies don’t know have epilepsy, or that, if they know 
of the epilepsy, are not informed about seizures that 
might evoke restrictions on licensure. A study of 50 
adult males with epilepsy supports this assumption 
(Quaglieri, 1977). Thirty-five lived in states that re- 
quire disclosure by persons with epilepsy to licen- 
sing agencies. In this group, 86% did not report even 
though 74% knew that the law required them to re- 
port, and 58% denied they had been told by their 
physicians that they had any duty to report. Four- 
teen percent told their physicians they had had one 
or more seizures while driving. Whether this strik- 
ing degree of noncompliance is prevalent is unclear, 
but it suggests that many persons who know they 
have epilepsy, and whose physicians know they 
have epilepsy, operate motor vehicles without for- 
mal restrictions on licensure. Some legal risks of 
failing to report are self-evident: loss of licensure, 
fines, criminal prosecution, claims for property 
damage, or injury. Less evident are the risks to 
those who do not have a statutory or other mandated 
duty to report. As to physicians, these risks will be 
considered later in this report. 
Epilepsy and employment 
Epilepsy as a disqualihing condition 
For the majority of persons with epilepsy whose 
seizures are well controlled and who are neurolog- 
ically unimpaired, no rational basis exists for re- 
stricting vocational opportunities. Yet employers 
continue to fire or refuse to hire epileptic persons 
without regard to clinical facts, and laws designed 
to deter such actions have met with only limited 
success (Epilepsy Foundation of America, 19856). 
Nevertheless, with improved public education 
about epilepsy and advances in pharmacotherapy, 
the lot of persons with epilepsy in the workplace 
may be improving, despite suboptimal implemen- 
tation of antidiscrimination laws. Aside from pro- 
viding effective treatment of seizures, physicians 
may be especially helpful to epileptic workers by 
counseling them about appropriate vocations and, 
with the consent of the workers, by informing em- 
ployers about the workers’ suitability for particular 
types of employment or about what types of restric- 
tions should be imposed. Where employers engage 
in discriminatory practices, physicians may play a 
central role in establishing that an epileptic person 
is qualified for a particular job and. help lay a foun- 
dation for a legal action to enforce a right to fair 
employment. J 
Antidiscrimination laws 
Federal and state statutes declare it unlawful for 
employers t o  discriminate against handicapped per- 
sons (Epilepsy Foundation of America, 19856). Epi- 
lepsy generally qualifies as a handicapping condi- 
tion under these laws, even if the epileptic is 
seizure-free and has a normal neurological exami- 
nation. Moreover, under the federal rehabilitation 
act (1973) that applies to employers who receive var- 
ious forms of federal support, mere belief by the 
employer that a person is handicapped counts as a 
handicap for purposes of triggering the enforcement 
sections of the law. These forbid employers from 
firing or refusing to hire handicapped persons who 
are “otherwise qualified” for a particular job solely 
on the basis of the perceived handicap. Although 
the federal law is a potentially powerful weapon 
against discrimination, it may not be a simple matter 
to prove its application. A claimant must not only 
establish that he or she is both handicapped and 
qualified, but also must show that the employer’s 
decision not to hire or to fire rested only on the 
existence of the particular handicap (e.g., epilepsy). 
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In the Arline case (1987), the U.S. Supreme Court 
considered the application of the federal antidiscri- 
mination law to a person who was classified by her 
employer as unqualified because of the employer’s 
arguably unfounded fears that she posed a risk to 
others. The Epilepsy Foundation of America filed 
an amicus brief because of its interest in assuring 
that epileptic persons not be denied employment be- 
cause of unfounded fears about their condition. In 
Arline, a public school teacher with a past history 
of recurrent tuberculosis was fired solely because 
the school board feared she might be contagious. In 
her suit against the school board for discriminatory 
firing, she asserted that, while her history of tuber- 
culosis constituted a handicap, she was currently 
qualified to teach, and that the board’s denying her 
a teaching position was based solely on her handi- 
cap. The school board justified the firing by arguing 
that her potential contagiousness made her unqual- 
ified to teach. The U.S. solicitor general intervened 
on behalf of the school board arguing that, since 
federal law or regulations did not expressly define 
handicap to include .a  contagious f disease, the 
teacher was not entitled to claim under the antidis- 
crimination law. The Supreme Court concluded that 
her tuberculosis could be viewed as a handicap, ex- 
pressly rejecting the notion that infectious illnesses 
were excluded from the coverage of the law, and 
declared that the law forbade her firing solely on the 
basis of her handicap. It emphasized that one pur- 
pose of the law was to prevent discrimination based 
on prejudice or ignorance, and remanded the case 
back to the federal district court for a particularized 
determination, based on “reasonable medical judg- 
ments,” as to whether her potential for transmitting 
tuberculosis was such as to affect her qualifications 
to teach in a classroom. 
This decision affirms the principle that employers 
offend against antidiscrimination laws when they in- 
voke concerns unrelated to a handicapped person’s 
ability to do a given job as a reason for denying 
access to that job. It also highlights the great im- 
portance of medical data for individualized deter- 
minations of a handicapped person’s capabilities or 
potential dangerousness. As to persons with epi- 
lepsy, relevant factors include the nature of sei- 
zures, degree of control of seizures with antiepilep- 
tic drugs, compliance with prescribed therapy, 
adverse reactions to antiepileptics, and extent of 
any neurological impairment. Findings relating to 
these factors will indicate what employment is ap- 
propriate, and will provide a basis for evaluating 
whether an employer’s decision to fire or refuse to 
hire was related to the person’s qualifications or 
solely to his or her epilepsy. Even if a handicap such 
as epilepsy disqualifies a person from a particular 
job, an employer also has a duty to make a reason- 
able accommodation to the handicap, such as of- 
fering a position for which the person is qualified. 
For example, in the recent Smith case (1987), a fed- 
eral court decided that a public transportation com- 
pany was not required to allow an epileptic em- 
ployee to operate a trolley car, even if antiepileptics 
were prescribed, and that it made a reasonable ac- 
commodation by offering the employee a clerical 
position. It is thus evident that physicians can both 
assist their epileptic patients in asserting a right to 
nondiscriminatory employment and assist employ- 
ers in making appropriate job placements. 
The “epilepsy defense” 
Treiman (1986) has recently reviewed the issue of 
ictal violence, noting an apparent rise in cases where 
persons charged with crimes have claimed their al- 
leged misconduct derived from epilepsy and not 
from criminal intent. Defendants invoke this so- 
called “epilepsy defense” to undercut the prose- 
cution’s assertion that they knowingly and willingly 
committed a criminal act. Because the prosecution 
must ordinarily prove all elements of a crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt, including intent to commit a 
crime, evidence that a defendant acted involuntarily 
or with less than full awareness may lead a jury to 
conclude that the defendant lacked criminal intent 
(or mens rea). 
Recent litigation in New York exemplifies a de- 
fendant’s successful use of the “epilepsy defense.” 
Mutter of Torsney (1979) involved a policeman who, 
without apparent provocation, shot and killed a 15- 
year-old boy. He pleaded a defense of “mental ill- 
ness” to a charge of murder. At his trial, a defense 
psychiatrist testified that the shooting either oc- 
curred during a psychomotor seizure or as part of 
a “psychosis associated with epilepsy.” Despite 
lack of a previous history of epilepsy and the opin- 
ions of neurologists that he did ‘not have epilepsy, 
a jury found him not guilty. The court then com- 
mitted him to a mental hospital, but there neither 
the examining psychiatrists or neurologists found 
evidence of mental illness or epilepsy. After a hear- 
ing in which further medical evidence was presented 
that he had neither epilepsy nor diagnosable mental 
illness, New York’s highest court ordered his re- 
lease. It reasoned that because there was no proof 
of mental illness, no justification existed for confin- 
ing him under a statute that requires proof of both 
mental illness and dangerousness as conditions of 
involuntary detention. A vigorous dissent argued 
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that the combination of an “explosive” personality 
and the specific violent act justified continuing in- 
voluntary hospitalization. 
The Torsney case underscores the question of 
whether violence directed at a particular person can 
be interpreted as an ictal event. If it can, invoking 
epilepsy as a basis for limiting or avoiding criminal 
liability seems an appropriate legal strategy, espe- 
cially if a defendant has epilepsy and a particular 
violent act was paroxysmal and incompatible with 
his usual behavior. However, despite studies indi- 
cating an increased prevalence of epilepsy among 
criminal populations and anecdotes of ictal violence 
(Mark and Ervin, 1970; Ashford et al., 1980; Pincus, 
1981), it is uncertain if directed ictal violence ever 
occurs. Delgado-Escueta el al. (1981) recently eval- 
uated 19 subjects with a history of suspected ictal 
violence by closed circuit television and constant 
monitoring of EEG. During the study, 13 exhibited 
aggression during documented seizures, including 
shouting, spitting, kicking, screaming, assaultive 
posturing, and destruction of property. None ex- 
hibited moderate or severe directed violence, and 
only one was aggressive towards a particular per- 
son. All subjects were amnesic for the aggressive 
episodes, and the episodes themselves were typi- 
cally sudden, stereotyped, unsustained, and never 
embodied a “consecutive series of purposeful 
movements.” From these data, the investigators 
suggested five criteria for determining if a violent 
act was an ictal event: diagnosis of epilepsy by a 
competent specialist, documentation of automa- 
tisms by closed-circuit television and biotelemetry, 
verification of aggressive conduct during docu- 
mented seizure, history that observed violence was 
characteristic of a person’s previous seizures, and 
judgment by a competent specialist that the act was 
in fact part of a seizure. 
If these criteria are rigidly applied, it seems likely 
that few, if any, episodes of directed violence would 
be classified as ictal events. While those testifying 
on behalf of a defendant who has pleaded the “epi- 
lepsy defense” may advance less rigorous criteria, 
data from this study provide a useful framework for 
courts to apply in evaluating an assertion that a spe- 
cific violent act derived from epilepsy. However, 
convincing as these data are on the general question 
of ictal violence, they can never be conclusive on 
the issue of whether a particular act by a particular 
defendant was or was not related to epilepsy. This 
is an issue that must finally be resolved by a court, 
taking into account the evidence offered by the med- 
ical witnesses of the opposing parties (Beresford, 
1980). 
PHYSICIAN AS TARGET OF SOCIAL 
CONTROL 
Malpractice liability 
Physicians caring for epileptic patients may be- 
come defendants in malpractice litigation by various 
routes. As indicated in the Duvall(l984) and Freese 
(1973) cases, these include allegedly negligent fail- 
ure to diagnose or treat epilepsy or failure to provide 
appropriate information concerning particular ther- 
apeutic decisions. The legal rules that govern mal- 
practice proceedings are straightforward: a claimant 
must show that it was more probable than not that 
the physician-defendant failed to observe reason- 
able or accepted standards of medical practice and 
that this failure caused quantifiable harm to the 
claimant. Application of the rules is not so straight- 
forward, however. There may be conflicting testi- 
mony from medical “experts” on whether a defen- 
dant acted reasonably, and it may be exceedingly 
difficult to decide whether it was the allegedly un- 
reasonable conduct or the disorder itself that pro- 
duced a particular harm. Moreover, once negligent 
causation of harm is established, it may be difficult 
to ascertain what is the proper measure of recover- 
able damages. For these reasons and because some 
malpractice claims are in themselves tenuous 
or baseless, claimants in the aggregate are more 
likely to lose than win a malpractice suit (Danzon, 
1984). 1 
Hurbeson v Parke Davis (1983) illustrates the piv- 
otal impact of expert testimony in a malpractice case 
and how a court may determine damages in the con- 
text of its own-social vision. The suit involved a 
claim by a woman with epilepsy that her physicians 
negligently failed to warn her of the risks of taking 
Dilantin during pregnancy. When she asked her 
physicians about these risks, they mentioned cleft 
palate and hirsutism but not the so-called “fetal hy- 
dantoin syndrome.” She later bore two children that 
her medical expert testified had this syndrome. He 
also testified that this syndrome was a known risk 
of Dilantin that should have been disclosed to a 
pregnant woman taking the drug. The Washington 
supreme court concluded that it was malpractice to 
omit this disclosure, and upheld liability for both 
“wrongful birth” and “wrongful life.” In calculat- 
ing damages for “wrongful life,” it decided that the 
children were entitled to recover amounts sufficient 
to meet the lifetime costs of care attributable to their 
affliction. However, it rejected an allowance for 
“pain and suffering,” in part because of the problem 
of quantifying an award based on comparing a mi- 
serable life with no life at all. It justified its overall 
W e p s i a .  Vol. 29, Suppl. 2. 1988 
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finding of liability by the need to encourage proper 
genetic counseling and provide a “comprehensive 
and consistent deterrent to malpractice.” 
This case offers several lessons. One is obvious: 
the dialogue between epileptics and their physicians 
about the risks of anticonvulsant therapy has pro- 
found legal implications. It must not be perfunctory 
and must address the particular situation of the pa- 
tient. Another is that in the rush to condemn lawyers 
for their role in malpractice litigation, physicians 
should not overlook the fact that no claimant pre- 
vails unless a medical professional ventures an opin- 
ion that the physician-defendant was negligent and 
that this negligence caused harm. Moreover, this 
opinion must be so persuasive that, despite contrary 
testimony by a defendant’s medical witnesses, a 
court will accept it as the most reasonable assess- 
ment of a disputed event. Thus, loss of a malpractice 
suit implies that both some professional peers and 
a court have found negligence. However, perhaps 
the most consequential lesson is the court’s per- 
ception that awards of damages not only compen- 
sate injured persons but encourage better practice. 
The notion that the threat of later financial loss de- 
ters physicians and others from socially unaccept- 
able conduct lies at the heart of expanding formu- 
lations of tort liability and the general sharp rise in 
costs of liability insurance. 
Liability to third parties 
While physicians can readily appreciate that their 
epileptic patients will risk harm to themselves by 
noncompliance with recommended treatments or 
other self-defeating behaviors, it is less easy to en- 
vision the risks of these behaviors to third parties. 
The most evident of these latter risks is driving in 
the face of uncontrolled or uncontrollable seizures. 
As previously noted, state laws generally seek to 
assure that epileptic persons or their physicians re- 
port to drivers’ licensing agencies so that the agen- 
cies can impose appropriate restrictions on driving. 
If such reporting is complete and accurate, it would 
seem that physicians should be free from any re- 
sponsibility for whatever harms their patients cause 
while d~ving.  But suppose state law requires that 
the patient report, that in fact no report is made, 
and that the patient drives in the face of continuing 
seizures. Is there a situation in which the physician 
might be held legally responsible for injuries to third 
parties resulting from a seizure the patient experi- 
ences while driving? 
One such scenario might arise where the physi- 
cian fails to prescribe appropriate antiepileptic 
drugs or fails to advise the patient of the risks of 
driving until it is known that seizures are control- 
lable. In the Duvull case (1984), persons injured in 
an accident caused by an epileptic person’s seizure 
brought suit against his physician. They alleged that 
the physician had failed to provide treatment and 
had failed to warn of the risks of driving without 
taking medications, and that these omissions vio- 
lated a duty the physician owed to them as members 
of the general public. The trial judge dismissed the 
suit, but the appeals court reversed this ruling. It 
concluded that the doctor-patient relationship im- 
posed a duty on the physician to take reasonable 
steps to control the dangerous conduct of his pa- 
tient, and that if the physician should have foreseen 
that failing to treat his patient’s epilepsy or warning 
him not to drive risked harm to other drivers, he 
could be found liable to the injured claimants. The 
court did not find the physician liable; it simply con- 
cluded that the theory of liability was valid. Ac- 
cordingly, the case was sent back to the trial court 
for further proceedings. Whatever the final dispo- 
sition in this case, it shows that under some circum- 
stances, law will impose on physicians a duty to 
protect persons whose interests are threatened by 
their patients. 
The implications of creating such a duty were ex- 
plored in the now famous Tarusoffcase (1976). The 
court clearly recognized the potential conflict with 
a physician’s duty to protect medical privacy or con- 
fidentiality, but concluded that a physician’s duty 
to warn a particular person whom he knew to be 
endangered outweighed his duty to respect confi- 
dentiality. Scholarly criticism of the result in Tur- 
asoff emphasized that requiring physicians to act in 
this way will only dissuade potentially dangerous 
patients from seeking or cooperating in medical care 
and will ultimately increase the risks to society 
(Stone, 1976). This critique seems especially rele- 
vant to the situation of the epileptic driver, effective 
management of whom depends heavily on a will- 
ingness to seek and follow medical advice (Masland, 
1978). Although the Turusaffdoctrine has not been 
widely adopted, the Michigan court accepted its ra- 
tionale in the Duvull case (1984) by creating a duty 
running from an epileptic’s physician to third par- 
ties. Thus, even if state law requires reporting by 
epileptic persons and not by their physicians, the 
physician who knows that an epileptic patient is 
driving, despite uncontrolled seizures and despite 
the physician’s warnings not to do. so, and who fails 
to take reasonable steps to prevent public harm may 
be vulnerable under the Tarusoff doctrine. One rea- 
sonable step for a physician to take is to notify the 
state licensing agency or local police department 
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and leave to that agency the matter of enforcing 
restrictions on driving. 
Nonconsensual reporting of this nature is a clear 
breach of medical confidentiality, and questions 
emerge about the potential liability of the physician 
who acts in this way. One threat is that the patient 
might sue for invasion of privacy. Another is that 
disclosure may violate state laws or regulations that 
protect communications between patients and phy- 
sicians. As indicated in Tarusoff and the accom- 
panying debate, however, the legal system will tol- 
erate violations of confidentiality that entail good 
faith efforts to protect the public and are propor- 
tionate to the degree of risk involved. Nevertheless, 
any nonconsensual disclosure of confidential infor- 
mation should rest on competent legal advice. 
A less complicated but still significant risk to the 
physician of an epileptic driver relates to the ad- 
verse effects of antiepileptic drugs. It is general 
knowledge that many of these drugs are potentially 
intoxicating, and it is foreseeable that they may ad- 
versely affect the capabilities to operate motor 
vehicles. Thus, if a patient has a motor vehicle ac- 
cident because of antiepileptic drug-induced intox- 
ication, both the patient and third parties may have 
a sustainable claim against the prescribing physician 
for injuries incurred in the accident if they can prove 
that an inappropriate drug or dosage of drug was 
prescribed, or that the physician failed to advise of 
the risk of sedation or failed to monitor treatment 
appropriately. The prospect of liability would be 
much diminished if the patient had been informed 
of the risks of sedation and the physician had mon- 
itored blood levels of antiepileptic drugs in an ap- 
propriate fashion. 
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Discussion 
Question: Are there any federal guidelines or reg- 
ulations that apply to interstate truckers with epi- 
lepsy ? 
Dr. Beresford: Yes, although I’m not familiar with 
them in detail. They are regulations, not statutes. 
Most of the original licensure that makes persons 
eligible to drive is handled on a state-by-state basis, 
and there are special provisions for chauffeurs’, 
public conveyance, and trucking licenses. I am just 
not familiar with the details. 
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Question: Would you comment on a physician’s 
liability should antiepileptic drugs not be prescribed 
for someone at low risk for seizure recurrence, for 
example, a single seizure, and such a patient sub- 
sequently has a seizure that engenders risk or actual 
damage to himself or someone else? 
Dr. Beresford: The standard in a malpractice suit 
is that a physician’s conduct must be shown to have 
deviated from reasonable or accepted standards of 
medical practice. If the balance of the evidence is 
that it is reasonable or accepted practice not to treat 
a single seizure, then the physician’s risk of liability 
is small. 
The problem with the malpractice suit, however, 
is that one gets into a battle of experts. In the rush 
by physicians to condemn lawyers and judges for 
what has happened in the court liability system, they 
sometimes forget that physicians are involved there 
as well, and that it is physicians who come into court 
and testify. Typically, it is the plaintiffs physician 
who is going to make or break the case. Because of 
this, one cannot give a doctrinaire answer. It seems 
to me, though, that with standard9 of practice evolv- 
ing in favor of not treating single seizures under 
many circumstances, it is a perfectly good defense 
should the issue come up. 
Dr. Pedley: There are a number of questions for 
Dr. Beresford that I am not going to ask because 
they relate to very particular circumstances, nor will 
I ask advice about when this or that patient can 
drive. I think the answers are so specific to the par- 
ticular circumstances, and so variable from state to 
state, that it really would not be appropriate to de- 
vote time to this. I refer you to your own attorneys 
who can advise you in light of what is relevant in 
your own state. 
Question: Based on one of the cases you dis- 
cussed, do you recommend that physicians use spe- 
cific terms such as “fetal hydantoin syndrome” 
when discussing teratogenic risks of antiepileptic 
drugs? 
Dr. Beresford: In a way, it is kind of unfortunate 
I used that particular case because of the factual 
question about whether that entity actually exists 
or is even an appropriate type of diagnosis. It has 
always seemed to me that the most important thing 
about informed consent is the quality of the dia- 
logue, and the fact that the dialogue is documented 
in the medical record. When one lists 99 things that 
may go wrong but does not list the 100th thing, and 
it is then the 100th thing that actually happens, it 
has always struck me as wrong that this then be- 
comes a basis for liability. 
In response specifically to your question, it seems 
to me that if one concludes that there is no such 
thing as fetal hydantoin syndromes but rather a va- 
riety of fetal effects that can occur with a number 
of antiepileptic drugs (and this seems to be the 
evolving view), then I do not think it is necessary 
to disclose it. 
Dr. Leppik: From a medical standpoint, I do what 
our local lawyers have advised me to do. That is, I 
bring up the issue of possible drug-related terato- 
genic effects with any woman of childbearing age 
and potential. I agree that the importance is not that 
you cover every conceivable complication, but that 
a discussion is initiated that indicates there are some 
risks associated with treatment. I also say that I 
think the risks are outweighed by the benefits of the 
treatment. 
I also make sure that patients have plenty of op- 
portunity to ask questions and open up to me about 
particular concerns they have, or have been advised 
about. Finally, I give them a written handout of 
some material that I prepared that goes over this 
issue in a general way. I fully agreed with Dr. Beres- 
ford that the idea of having to list every possible 
complication is very counterproductive. 
Question: Have recent changes resulting in in- 
creased flexibility for epileptic patients’ obtaining 
licensure, for example, Maryland’s recent reduction 
in length of time required for seizure control to 3 
months, resulted in any increased number of acci- 
dents, injuries, or litigation from seizure-related ac- 
cidents? 
Dr. Beresford: Not that I am aware of. 
Question: Are there any legal implications for 
physicians who prescribe generic brands of anti- 
epileptic drugs as opposed. to brand names? 
Dr. Beresford: The only implication would be if 
there is convincing evidence that the generic drug 
is inferior. This is one of those fact questions. It 
goes back to the state of the medical evidence. 
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